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The grab of the world’s land and water resources
FRANKLIN OBENG-ODOOM*
In this paper, I review recent developments in global political economy and po-
litical economy of development that have captured inter alia the attention of agrar-
ian political economists. I do so through the periscope of two recent publications 
by Fred Pearce, Great Britain’s leading eco journalist and an edited volume by Tony 
Allan, Martin Keulertz, Suvi Sojamo and Jeroen Warner, scholars trained in different 
disciplines and based at various universities in the UK, the Netherlands, and Finland. 
The account of the pace, places, and perpetrators, procedures, and problems of this 
particular agrarian model provides fodder for the further development of a locus 
classicus on what is happening to the land question in this current moment under 
the capitalist order, a shorthand for which is ‘water and land grab’.
Keywords: Land; development; political economy; water; !nancial crises.
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INTRODUCTION
These books contain a disturbing thesis: The triple crises of capital, in the form 
of financial meltdown, climate change, and food prices, are creating massive ex-
ploitation, expropriation, and forced eviction in the agrarian sector of the global 
economy. The scale is massive, and the location diverse, as are the victims and 
perpetrators. 
While, many academic papers, NGO reports, media articles, and press releases 
on the subject abound, it is these two books that have, to date, taken a more in-
depth and sustained approach to investigating the phenomenon. The Land Grab-
bers (Pearce, 2012) was the first to be published, but the absence of references to 
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it in the Handbook of Land and Water Grabs in Africa (Allan et al., 2013) which 
was published later suggests that neither the editors nor the numerous contributors 
to the Handbook were aware of Fred Pearce’ major contribution. This is an impor-
tant oversight in the Handbook, and perhaps was the reason the editors proclaimed 
that “[i]t is the most comprehensive publication to date on the new enclosure of 
Africa’s farmland” (Allan et al., 2013, iii, preface). I think it best to consider these 
books as jointly deserving of the accolade of ‘most comprehensive account’. They 
have different features, but they are complementary rather than competitive. 
Pearce is one of Britain’s leading investigative eco journalist, and his book 
benefits from his erudite and engaging writing style. It is accessible, well organised, 
informed, and personalised. His observations are reported systematically, and his 
analysis grounded in evidence, although he does not always reference his same way 
academics usually do it. The book is rich in personal and informed details of spe-
cific cases of land grabbing around the world, from poorer (e.g., Sudan) to rich but 
relatively small countries (e.g., Saudi Arabia), and then the richer and bigger coun-
tries (e.g., Australia). The book is the product of Pearce’ field travels, interviews, 
and engagement with people who have facilitated, resisted, or actually grabbed land, 
and water. The Land Grabbers is divided into 27 chapters, in six parts, looking at 
land grabbing across the world. There are blank pages after each chapter for read-
ers to make notes, so this is a very user friendly book. 
The Handbook is more ‘academic’, and not written in a style as accessible as 
Pearce’ book. It is an edited collection, to be sure, with writers from different back-
grounds and academic and professional styles, so some writers are a lot more acces-
sible than others. It contains an impressive blend of more seasoned writers on Afri-
can political economy such as Padraig Carmody and Liz Alden Wiley and younger, 
but known, writers on land grab such as Jessica Chu of the School of Oriental and 
African Studies. It is organised in five parts, respectively looking at the history of 
land grabs (pp. 9 -88), investors’ profiles and investments (pp. 89-207), the political 
economy of land and water grabs (pp. 221-334), the environment (pp. 335-418), 
and livelihoods (pp. 419-468). The book has a comprehensive index (pp. 469-488) 
to guide readers and, as with other edited volumes, a succinct description of the 
backgrounds and interests of the editors and the contributors (pp. xiv-xxii) to enable 
readers to put a ‘face’ to the various accounts in the book. 
The editors of the Handbook, a creative blend of scholars at different stages 
in their career, made a courageous attempt to contextualise the various contribu-
tions, but were not entirely successful. For example, the aim of the Handbook is 
stated by the editors as follows:
This handbook has been put together to help investors, farmers, tra-
ders and the other food supply chain players understand how foreign 
direct investment in African water and land resources could impact food 
availability and therefore food commodity prices (...) The chapters of 
this book have been assembled now because there is a need on the part 
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of would-be investors to understand the history of previous phases of 
inward investment in land and water in Africa. (Allan et al., 2013, p. 6)
Yet, many contributions do not fit this vision. Indeed, the idea of food as ‘com-
modity’ is severely rebuked by some contributors, while others do not regard land 
grab as ‘foreign direct investment’. In fairness to the editors, they do acknowledge 
that the chapters and concerns of the contributors are broad ranging, but their 
suggestion that the book is written to help the investor or supply a knowledge gap 
for investment is inconsistent with many of the chapters in the book. Indeed, some 
of the chapters talk about struggles and how they can be sustained (e.g., Allan et 
al., 2013, pp. 456-468), and the limitations of investor or investment driven regu-
lations, from the perspective of smallholders and national governments (e.g., Allan 
et al., 2013, pp. 286-298). 
Another quibble is that, while I found the division of the book into various 
parts useful, overall, it was hard to see how the descriptors were chosen. Take the 
part on political economy, for example. Some of the chapters offer depoliticised 
analysis, have little to say about capital, power, and distribution, to name but a 
few features of political economic analysis, so it is not clear why or in what ways 
they are ‘political economic’. Also, one of the chapters in Part III, ‘The political 
economy of land and water grabs’ is called ‘political economy of land and water 
grabs’ (Allan et al., 2013, pp. 257-272), so again it was unclear to me in what 
sense the term, political economy was being used. The analysis on class struggle 
could easily have been in Part III, but it is placed in Part V, Livelihoods. Clearly, 
there is some arbitrariness in how to draw boundaries. Yet, in my opinion these 
quibbles are slight, and merely pedantic. Indeed, there are some chapters which 
aptly live the aim of the book as articulated by the editors, such as “(…) How 
foreign direct investment can support sustainable intensification” (Allan et al., 
2013, pp. 359-375), which is a depoliticised analysis of how best investors can 
‘help’ poor people in Africa. 
There is a lot of excellent work done by the editors for which they deserve 
commendation, and their book, full endorsement. Pulling together this array of 
contributors and contributions from all over the world, from writers on the topic 
and in allied areas on such a ‘hot’ issue is a major achievement. While the book 
literally stammers in a few parts (e.g., Allan et al., 2013, pp. 311-333) where it is 
hard to see a contribution, other than matters already stated, and well known it 
picks up and sustains momentum in most parts. In any case, as I shall discuss below, 
the book offers deep insights and unearths gray areas in need of further investiga-
tion. The explicit focus on water, ‘blue’ and ‘green’, substantially expands the ongo-
ing conversation on the land grab phenomenon.
The Land Grabbers and the Handbook of Land and Water Grabs in Africa are 
a must read. What I attempt to do, from this point on, is to highlight their specific 
contribution using what I call the ‘6 Ps’ — Pace and Places, Perpetrators, Procedures, 
Problems, Proposals, and Prospects — of land and water grabbing.
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PACE AND PLACES
Since 2007-8, large tracts of land have been leased to foreign and local interests 
for periods as long as 99 years. When GRAIN, the global NGO, first broke the 
news in 2008 around which time Daewoo was negotiating what eventually turned 
out to be an abortive land deal in Madagascar (Borras and Franco, 2012), the 
initial estimates given were 2.5 million hectares of land. Subsequently, the World 
Bank updated the figure to 56 million hectares around 2010. Now the figure seems 
to be around 71 million hectares (International Land Coalition, 2012). The state-
ment of intent about obtaining large tracts of land, as opposed to actual leases is, 
however, in the region of 203 million hectares of land. These figures are likely to 
be conservative because a substantial amount of land deals go unreported, are 
shrouded in secrecy, and do not make it to any central body to collate the figures. 
Furthermore, some of the countries offering deals have done no proper scientific 
mapping. Thus, Pearce (2012, p. 45) recounts, how they quote unfounded claims. 
In the case of South Sudan, for example, one deal was said to be for 600,000 acres 
in Lainya, but crosschecking shows that the county of Lainya is itself only 340,000 
hectares big.
In addition to ‘physical land’, water has also been grabbed for the purpose of 
irrigating particular ‘grabbed’ parcels of land. In Senegal, a 400,000 acre deal to 
Saudi Arabia is close to River Senegal which will be the source of irrigation (Pearce, 
2012, p. 33). In South Sudan, the new government seems to be negotiating a deal 
to send water to Egypt by preparing to allow Egypt to construct a canal to channel 
water from the Nile around the giant Sudd Swamp in South Sudan which is the 
second largest swamp in the world and the home of a great wildlife diversity and 
pasture. For Egypt, the canal will enable the Nile to deliver more water to it because 
currently the swamp saps a great deal of water en route to Egypt, a one year jour-
ney during which a lot of the water evaporates (Pearce, 2012, p. 49). Generally, 
under international law, host countries must undertake to provide water to inves-
tors as without water investors cannot fully benefit from their investment. In turn, 
governments may be sued if, in the process of supplying water to their citizens, they 
are unable to satisfy international private interests (Pearce, 2012, pp. 102-103).
PERPETRATORS
The identity and methods of the land grabbers vary greatly. Countries, state 
corporations, private interests, missionaries, NGOs, and universities are all involved. 
International interests dominate, although local actors are partakers too. Unlike 
pre 2007-8 land leases, the current lessees come from within and without the West, 
including from countries such as South Korea, Saudi Arabia, and India which have 
been prominent in land purchases. ‘Traditional’ land grabbers such as the UK have 
remained active too. 
The exact role of China, as a perpetrator, seems to be shrouded in some con-
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troversy. Land Portal (2012) suggests that China is one of the leading land grabbers, 
but this is contradicted by these books. However, the Handbook (Allan et al., 2013, 
pp. 91-103) contains evidence to contradict such accounts, positing massive Chi-
nese investment in the agrarian sector in Africa. Apparently, China’s investment in 
the agrarian sector is not as huge. To be sure, China has changed its aid policy to 
become increasingly focused on agriculture in Africa where the Chinese state be-
lieves it can contribute a lot by way of technical assistance. So, it might be that 
China’s influence in the sector will increase overtime but for now it is not as wide-
spread as is generally believed. One key feature of Chinese investment in agriculture 
is that, while increasing population is exerting pressure on national food policy, for 
the Chinese state it seems it is more of geopolitical influence, control, and relevance 
in geopolitics that explain its interest in acquiring large tracts of land (Pearce, 2012, 
pp. 199-205). Still, there are major concerns about conditions of labour in Chinese-
led agro investments. Even more noteworthy is the seeming top-down idea inherent 
in the new Chinese policy on aid for the agric sector — a departure from an invest-
ment orientation in other sectors where the stated objective more about mutual 
learning and benefit (Allan et al., 2013, pp. 436-445). This change is disturbing as 
agriculturalists have long established the importance of bottom-up, and farmer-led 
approaches or participatory learning and action, as recently demonstrated in Food 
Security in Africa and Asia: Strategies for Small-Scale Agricultural Development 
(Bakker, 2011). 
While the activities of other perpetrators such as private business people mas-
querading as religious persons, and eco activists (Pearce, 2012) will appear as no 
news, the Handbook reveals there is a stratum of land grabbers for whom very 
little attention has been given in the media, academic papers, and reports. These 
are rich or relatively well off civil servants, and private entrepreneurs who are based 
in the city, and urban based companies that grab land in the countryside. These are 
the ‘domestic, urban land grabbers’ whose activities are not new in the history of 
agriculture. What is ‘new’ is the intensity, the scale, and the size of plots grabbed, 
since the 2008 crises of capital. One reason for the increase is the opportunity for 
profit and the rush of foreign capital, but another reason is government encourage-
ment for them to invest in agriculture and ‘modernise’ the sector. The Handbook 
describes these dynamics in the case of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Benin (Allan et al., 
2013, pp. 146-159).
The two books show that the varying personalities involved in land and water 
grabbing, are closely associated with the methods used. However, three common 
approaches have been used to obtain land leases, so far. One, negotiations with 
central government without local government and local chiefs. Two, negotiations 
with local chiefs without central and local government and local community and, 
three, negotiations with central and local government and local elites, include chiefs, 
but no consultation with other elders in the communities. The triggers or factors 
influencing success and failure of negotiations are mainly religious affinity, wheth-
er title is recognised, and level of development (Schoneveld et al., 2011; Pearce, 
2012). Also, rich governments improve their chances of seeking land deals by invest-
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ing in dilapidated infrastructure of poorer countries in return for land. That is evi-
dently, what for a while, was going to happen in Kenya where the government of 
Qatar was going to build a billion dollar port facility in exchange for a 100,000 
acres of land on Lamu Island (Pearce, 2012, p. 36).
The role of the global financial institutions, such as the World Bank, has been 
shadowy, namely consigned to carrying out studies to identify vacant land. Also, 
they have favoured the registration of titles to make it easier to trade in land. On 
the part of investors, the books show that the financial power houses have offered 
huge loans, others have directly invested, and many more have offered guarantee 
and investment advice. Glossy magazines have been produced and an aggressive 
campaign used to encourage people to invest (Allan et al., 2013). How to make 
sense of all these dynamics — whether to call them ‘pro development’ or ‘anti de-
velopment’ — critically depends on which method or procedures are used for anal-
ysis. Again, the two books showcase a range of procedures. 
PROCEDURES
The books apply five main types of analysis, namely ethnography, legal, tech-
nocratic, political ecology, and political economy, and historical. Pearce Book might 
be regarded as using a kind of quasi ethnographic method, as the account is based 
on his observations as participant or non participant in different land and water 
grabbing locations, while travelling around the world. This makes his work richer 
in stories, and personal details. A few of the chapters in the Handbook adopt a 
similar approach (e.g., Allan et al., 2013, pp. 91-103), but the rest use a political 
ecology or economy approach. Those that use political ecology seem to look at the 
issue of land grabbing through the lens of power and how it influences the grab of 
water and other natural resources, while those employing political economy tend 
to look, among other things, at power relations, class, global capitalist and how 
they shape, and constrain land grabbing. Perhaps, the use of political ecology in 
this context is more effective as it more forcefully draws attention to ‘water grabs’ 
which have, relative to land, not obtained careful attention. However, it seems some 
contributors to the Handbook (e.g., p. 40) thought it better to combine political 
economy and ecology as the dynamics of land grabbing are wedded to broader 
political economic processes. 
To this end, it was surprising that political economic concepts and lenses such 
as Karl Polanyi’s double movement (Polanyi, 1954 [2001]), the question of land 
taxation from Henry George (1879 [2006]), and Philip McMichael (e.g., McMi-
chael and Buttel, 1990) and Harriet Friedmann’s (e.g., Friedmann, 1982) well 
known food regime analyses did not get any careful attention. An attempt was 
made to use ‘cycles’ to analyse land grabbing (Allan et al., 2013, pp. 243-256), but 
such cycles these were explained more generally, not really in terms of food produc-
tion. Admittedly, even the regime analysis needs some adaptation to take into ac-
count the dynamics of land and water, as the approach was developed mainly to 
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look at food. The current phenomenon, on the other hand, is not only about food, 
as the books show. It involves bio-fuel crops, water, and timber, not originally cap-
tured in the regime analysis. 
A historical touch is evident throughout these books, especially in the Hand-
book. Indeed, it had a section devoted entirely to the history of land grabbing. 
However, it is not clear whether merely recounting the history of enclosures, espe-
cially colonial attempts to ‘grab’ land constitutes a ‘historical method’. More fun-
damentally, some of the chapters told interesting historical stories (e.g., Allan et al., 
2013, pp. 57-70) but their connection to the contemporary experiences were hard 
to see, other than to say that land grabbing is not new. 
A historical method ought to do more than that, in my opinion. At least it 
ought to demonstrate the strategies and dynamics of how the state has historically 
played a role in the accumulation of capital, and in what ways that has evolved, 
how the old order continues to shape agrarian change today and tomorrow, and 
how the reification of customs, manipulation of customary law, and adoption of 
Western law as a social good paved the way for the current land and water grabs 
(TNI, 2012). It is such elements, among others, that use the past to inform the pres-
ent and the future and correct misrepresentations of today, especially in Africa 
(Njoh, 2012), that a ‘good’ historical approach will engender (see, for example, 
Tuma, 1971; Greif, 1998). 
From this perspective, most of the chapters succeeded, but not many of those 
consigned to part 1 on history, as they merely recounted the history of colonial 
enclosures and did not connect forcefully to the present. Yet, the contributions in 
the rest of the Handbook use the historical method effectively. In particular, the last 
chapter is an exemplar. It showed how the perpetrators land and water grab have 
historically encountered resistance and continue to do so, thus confronting colonial 
narratives that cast customary owners of land as acquiescent. That chapter also 
challenged the oversimplification syndrome that ‘culture’ and ‘community’ are a 
panacea to land grabbing and confronts discourses about how modernisation and 
titling and indeed law (legal method/approach to analysis) can and do facilitate 
water and land grabbing. While it does that, it shows the various levels of struggles 
in the process, and raises the question of what the struggles are all about.
PROBLEMS
The books are unanimous on the tensions and contradictions of land and 
water grabbing. They show that the declared motives used to ‘sell’ the land and 
water grab idea — mainly offering jobs to local people, taxation revenues to gov-
ernments, and mechanisation of the entire agricultural sector — have turned out 
to be wild expectations. That is, some of these benefits have trickled in, in some 
cases, but they are a drop in the ocean, considering that large communities have 
had to be moved and large tracts of land offered. Further, in most cases taxes have 
been waived to attract the perpetrators, so tax revenues are yet to be realised. Fur-
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ther, in situations when jobs have been created, the conditions of the workers have 
not been considered, or that jobs have been transient. In some cases too, peasants 
have been turned into wage labourers or that social differentiation has been cre-
ated among the class of workers, something known among Marxist political econ-
omists as ‘labour aristocracy’. Owners have been turned to tenants on their own 
land, for periods sometimes as long as 99 years.
More ominous is the threat to different layers of water property rights for fish-
ers, farmers, and hunters, women and children who depend on water for housework, 
all these stand threatened with the enclosures of water. Even scarier is that interna-
tional law will tend to favour investors’ rights to water when the issue comes up for 
arbitration (Pearce, 2012, pp. 102-103). This is why regulating water rights, that is, 
insisting on the inclusion of water right clauses is likely to trump customary prac-
tices and norms about access to and use of water. Indeed, governments, motivated 
by obtaining more FDIs, are likely to favour commercial deals about water over the 
free use by indigenous people. And, in such cases international law tend to hold that 
parties respect the terms of the contract, regardless of the local situation (Allan et 
al., 2013, p. 288), regardless of whether there is a drought, and regardless of wheth-
er there is a humanitarian crisis. Similarly, even in the face of famine in the most 
desperate country, international investment agreements (IIAs) will hold the terms of 
the agreements sacrosanct, even if unjust, inhuman, or unkind, as Pearce (2012, p. 
103) notes. The books show that the agreements will tend to favour investors any-
way, so investment or ‘contract water’ and land grab are not as good as sometimes 
claimed. Indeed, the threat of pollution from mechanised farming, and possible cross 
country conflicts, as a recent study (Rahman, 2012) has shown.
To date, these problems have not been equally borne. Settler migrants, and 
other minority groups, women, and children, according these books, have suffered 
disproportionately more. What the books do not carefully show is that, in some 
cases, investors have also been swindled, so it is not the case that all investors 
have benefitted. An example is the case of Greenleaf Global Plc which was oper-
ating in Ghana and Togo. Investors sunk GBP 8.2 million into land deals with the 
promise that they would receive a return of about 20 per cent within 12 months 
when, in fact, no careful prior analysis had been made. Also, the company had 
claimed it had had a bountiful harvest in 2010 and paid huge returns to investors 
when, in fact, no such thing had every happened. In the end, the company was 
rendered insolvent (Insolvency Service, 2012). In fairness to the editors of the 
Handbook, especially, one chapter (Allan et al., 2013, pp. 146 -159) does indicate 
that domestic grabbers fail to reap the rewards they expected, but even then, the 
reason given is one of inexperience not deceit. Yet, such crises among the investor 
class are isolated. Many pension and hedge fund managers are pouring investment 
into land and water grab, mainly because the returns are good. On the contrary, 
a disproportionate share of the cost of grabbing is borne by local people, so how 
to change the skewed distribution of benefits and costs gets some attention in the 
two books.
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PROPOSALS 
Here, there is some tension in the books, especially the Handbook. While 
some seem to suggest that the recognition or formalisation of indigenous rights 
and hence the compensation of indigenous people if their rights are trampled 
upon is a panacea (pp. 11-23), others suggest this ‘way of seeing’ is woefully in-
adequate because there are many countries the world over (e.g., Ghana and South 
Sudan) where such formalisation has not stopped, or led to a propitious outcome 
for the general wellbeing of the people (e.g., Allan et al., 2013, pp. 24-42; pp. 
286-296; pp. 57-70). 
For Pearce, prioritising small scale farming is the answer to the crises in the 
agrarian sector. He provides formidable evidence of how small holder farmers in 
either the urban or rural setting in Africa and Asia, and indeed elsewhere, have 
produced sustainably — on small plots, using and recycling farm generated re-
sources and marketing the produce locally. Further, he offers evidence on how small 
scale farming has led to growing incomes of farmers and led to an increase in food 
production. In urban areas, Pearce shows how the use of urban agriculture can 
create greater interaction between the city, the peri-urban area, and the countryside. 
In turn, Pearce advocates the support of smallholders through extension services 
and subsidies (see Pearce, 2012, pp. 291-301). 
Pearce does not show how to move from ‘here’ to ‘there’, but the Handbook 
does. One contributor suggests struggle, Awake! Aluta continue! Not everyone 
writing for the handbook is in favour of this approach. Others argue that it is not 
the only way. Alternatives such as contract farming, where the investor contracts 
with the small farmer to take their land or buy their produce, are posited. Another 
suggestion is where a rich investor creates an estate and buys off produce from 
small scale out growers in a so-called ‘impact investment’. 
A third is a model where the investor leases the land off poor people, or buys 
their labour and turns them into wage labour, or a combination of these. Other 
similarly ‘practical’ suggestions are partnering the community in a private-commu-
nity partnership. Examples from Tanzania and Sierra Leone are presented to back 
these claims as successful (Allan et al., 2013, pp. 160-177). However, it would seem 
that a lot more research will be required to ascertain whether these projects achieve 
their posited win-win outcomes, especially so when it is hard to describe as ‘equal 
party to a contract’ challenging to try to force an agreement between substantially 
unequal partners (as in a big investor and a poor farmer). While these types of al-
ternatives make land grabbing transparent, they are still land grabbing. And, they 
tend to facilitate land grabbing, assuming that it must happen (TNI, 2012), when, 
in fact, in both Sierra Leone (see, for example, Lynch et al., 2012) and Tanzania 
(see, for example, Dubbeling, 2010) there is formidable evidence that small holder 
farming is making a tremendous impact on social change. 
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PROSPECTS
A key contribution of these books is that they give clear suggestions of where 
further research is required. Six of them are particularly pressing. One, the phe-
nomenon of urban domestic elites capturing land requires more study, as the current 
discussion in the media and academic journals is predominantly on international 
angles of land and water grabs. It would be interesting to know whether elites 
partner with investors and how their investment pattern differ from and are similar 
to the internationals. In particular, it will be interesting to know what are the rela-
tionships with the state. Two, more research is needed on the emerging area of 
struggles related to water rights and in what ways they are similar to or different 
from struggles about land. Three, Rural-urban migration, resulting from water and 
land grab, is yet to be studied. 
Four, questions of investor swindling within the class of investors are not well 
known. Five, there is the important issue of hierarchy between regional (e.g., AU) 
and global development bodies (e.g., UN) as they grope to find ways of addressing 
the concerns with land and water grabbing, with their many voluntary guidelines. 
Six, the ‘eco friendly’ motive of buying large expanse of land for conservation 
purposes requires frank analysis. Is it consistent with values of social justice to 
commodify nature’s gifts for sale, before saving them? If so, what kinds of prop-
erty rights should indigenous people retain on such ‘enclosures’? Finally, there is 
the crucial issue of how to make economics, especially land economics, education 
critical and hence relevant to the tensions and contradictions enveloping the water 
and land question. 
CONCLUSION
Fred Pearce’ The Land Grabbers and Tony Allan and his colleagues’ the Hand-
book of Land and Water Grabs in Africa are as yet the most comprehensive one-
stop-shop accounts of the global phenomenon of land and water grabbing. Col-
lectively, they illuminate the pace and places, perpetrators, procedures, problems, 
and proposals for attending a more sustainable world. They are a must read for 
people who are interested in eco justice, development, land use and planning, and 
political economy of the global order, either as general readers, practitioners, activ-
ists, teachers, students, consultants, or policy makers. Those interested in the glob-
al economic crises who have, to date, focused on the meltdown of financial markets 
need to read these books to see how far is the contagion and how wide are its 
impacts. Further, the books give material to stimulate future research in the areas 
of domestic, urban and rural based water and land grab, the hierarchies of power 
between regional and global political economic organisations, struggles with, for, 
and about the phenomenon, and, the contradictions in investment, as investors rush 
to make big agrarian profits. Even more fundamentally, the book raises the need 
for a re-engagement with the marginal (ised) sub discipline of land economics, why 
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it ought to be made more critical, and the continuing expansion and improvement 
of tools and lenses of political economy on a world scale. For all these reasons, 
these books are highly recommended. 
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